2 International and UK responses to the war
Sanctions
One early response to the Russian invasion was the imposition of sanctions on the activities of the Russian state, businesses and individuals by the UK and other Western nations. A wide range of sanctions have already been implemented, from the freezing of foreign exchange reserves to the UK’s targeting of over 120 oligarchs with a net worth of over £140 billion.
Are sanctions working?
In certain settings, sanctions can serve as a form of active non-violence that confronts aggression and injustice. In the context of Russia, sanctions are intended to deter against further escalation whilst also limiting the capacity of Russia to meet the high costs of war. The effectiveness of present sanctions remains a matter of debate. Whilst inflation in Russia is high and the economy shrunk by 6% in 2022 (in relation to its growth forecast for the year), the country has been successful in monetary intervention to prop up the ruble and has switched some oil and gas exports to China and India. However, sanctions have begun to cause Russia difficulties in funding its invasion, and these challenges are likely to increase if the conflict becomes further protracted.
Are sanctions ethical?
It would be difficult to justify a ‘business as usual’ approach towards Russia when it has acted so aggressively in violation of international law. Many people believe that imposing sanctions is important to send a message to any government considering aggressive actions that imperilling international order will have consequences on their economic ties with the global community. Ethical questions come to the fore around the intended purpose of sanctions, the targets of sanctions, the collateral effects (within the sanctioned state and more broadly on other states) and the proper authority to endorse any sanction regime. [For example the UN Security Council was not an option on this occasion because of Russia’s membership.]
What are the global impacts of sanctions?
Sanctions on Russia have resulted in collateral economic impacts on households in impoverished nations in Africa and Asia. At a time of severe food shortages, many African economies have been hit with higher grain and vegetable oil prices. While the extent to which sanctions are responsible for this is unclear, there remains a popular perception among publics that they are. For many countries in Africa, any extension of further secondary sanctions by the United States or European nations on fuels or other strategic products would be unpopular and cause resentment. This could encourage some to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with China, and with Russia as well.
Where does it end?
Sanctions are easier to impose than they are to lift. The ultimate hope is that sanctions lead the offending Government to decide that the costs of war outweigh the benefits, and to change course. However, the criteria for the lifting of sanctions remains unclear. If Western imposed sanctions were to linger following the negotiation of a resolution, it will increase the perception that sanctions are motivated by a desire to inflict lasting economic and political damage, rather than to accomplish a pre-determined goal. Sanctions are easier to support when the criteria are well defined.
Military support
Ukraine has received significant amounts of military support from NATO countries, including anti-tank weapons, artillery, ammunition, air-defence systems, aerial drones, tanks and armoured personnel carriers and intelligence data from satellites. In 2022, the UK provided £2.3 billion of military aid to Ukraine – more than any other European nation, with a similar amount promised for 2023. The provision of F16 fighter jets would likely be a game-changer for the Ukrainian military.
Should the UK increase its defence budget in light of the war in Ukraine?
The UK government has committed to sustaining high levels of military spending, in spite of the fiscal situation and constrained public spending budgets. In contrast, the UK’s dedicated financial contribution to conflict stabilisation and mediation is relatively small and declining.
Our churches have often opposed increases in military spending on the grounds that such increases will promote strategies based on military threat while divert attention and resources from mediation, co-operation and multilateralism. The context of the war in Ukraine might cause a questioning of this position. Ukraine is clearly in critical need of armaments for its defence, but exactly how much military support and what type of support the UK should be providing? Does our support go beyond what is needed for defence capabilities? What happens to the weapons after the conflict? And what are the implications for public finances of this additional expenditure?
Nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons have influenced strategic calculations in this conflict in two opposing directions. Firstly, NATO countries have not provided troops on the ground in Ukraine partly out of fear that this could lead to a direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed state. Secondly, Russia has been emboldened through its possession of nuclear weapons to initiate a war by conventional means.
Could Russia use nuclear weapons?
Russia is thought to have the lowest threshold for nuclear weapons use among the five nuclear-armed states, and President Putin has alluded to nuclear weapons use in some statements when referring to using “all means” to defend Russia. However, those speaking in an official capacity for Putin’s administration are inclined to stress the limited circumstances for Russian use of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon, to provide the international community with some reassurance.
Tactical nuclear weapons cannot provide Russia with an advantage on the battlefield, as Ukrainian forces tend to be dispersed and are relatively vulnerable to conventional strikes. Obviously, any resort to nuclear weapons, whatever their size, would have devastating and lasting consequences. There are understandable concerns that if Putin loses not only the four southern provinces but Crimea as well, he might well resort to more desperate measures. Any use of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons risks nuclear escalation.
NATO leaders and China have responded to Russia’s aggressive rhetoric with an insistence that a nuclear war can never be won and therefore must never be fought. It is important that this statement is not undermined by the repositioning of any nuclear forces, including US tactical nuclear weapons, during the conflict. [The United States plans to re-introduce US tactical nuclear weapons to the UK. They were withdrawn from the UK in 2006 after widespread public opposition.]
Are there still prospects for nuclear disarmament?
Russia’s invasion, plus NATO’s support of the Ukrainian military forces, demonstrate only too clearly that nuclear weapons are ineffective at ‘keeping the peace’ and suppressing conventional conflict, contrary to the claims of nuclear-armed states.
The Baptist Union, Methodist Church and United Reformed Church have long taken the view that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons is immoral and consider the negotiation of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction an urgent imperative. Our Churches continue to work with global civil movements such as ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) to realise this objective. The vast majority of the world’s nations are losing patience with the vague and unfulfilled promises of the nuclear-armed states on nuclear disarmament. This must remain a focus for governments and of advocacy by churches, individuals and other groups in civil society.
More broadly the structures for negotiating arms control are in disarray; the Conference on Disarmament is ineffective and its composition and procedures are not fit for purpose. Disarmament requires a global conversation as has been afforded by the UN Secretary General’s New Agenda for Peace. This should be followed as soon as possible by a fourth UN Special Session on Disarmament to restructure the global forums for diplomacy on arms control.